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Abstract
A former President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Paolo Carozza draws on his personal experience to identify and propose solutions for a key flaw in the Inter-American Human Rights System: the division between English-language member states and states with Latin-based
languages. Terming this division “The Anglo-Latin Divide,” Carozza traces
the division not only to linguistic difference, but also to differences in legal traditions. He explains how the differences between Anglo tradition of
common law and the Latin tradition of civil law manifest in both substantive
and procedural divides within the Inter-American Human Rights system, including in sensitive areas of the law such as right-to-life cases. Carozza offers
solutions for the future, ranging from changing the composition of the InterAmerican Court and Commission to the radical solution of requiring universal ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights. Ultimately,
Carozza concludes that, whatever the solution, the viability and strength of
the Inter-American system requires a much stronger effort to integrate the
English-speaking world into a Latin-dominated system.

† Director of the Helen Kellog Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame;
Director of the JSD Program in International Human Rights Law at the University of Notre Dame
Law School; Concurrent Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame.
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I Introduction
Even the most casual and inexperienced observers of the Inter-American human rights system cannot fail to notice a peculiarly binary division running
right down its center and distinguishing it from the other two major regional
systems. The Inter-American system evinces in various ways a fundamental gap
between the relative shallowness of its engagement of the English-speaking countries of the Western Hemisphere, on the one hand, and the depth and breadth
of its integration of the region’s countries having predominantly Latin-based (or
Romance) languages, on the other. Moreover, those with a more sophisticated
understanding of the system, its history, and its functioning—perhaps especially
those who have experienced the practical operation of the Inter-American human
rights institutions from within—know that this division is not merely superficial,
but instead pervades many different aspects of the system.
This is not to deny, of course, that there are many important divergences
to be observed and distinctions to be made within those groups of countries
that share a common language: the English-speaking Caribbean is not simply
assimilable to the United States, nor the United States to Canada;1 the same
is true of the Spanish-speaking countries of the region, not to mention the vital differences between Brazil or Haiti and the Spanish-language nations, for
example. Indeed, the differences within the language groups are often sharper
than across them. Nevertheless, none of that negates the existence of what I
call the “Anglo-Latin Divide” on human rights in the Americas. Some of the
more broadly generalizable differences stem from the common law roots of the
English-speaking countries, setting them off from the predominantly civil law
(or “Romano-Germanic”) origins of the Latin countries.2 Other aspects of the
divide have more to do with the distinctiveness of the Caribbean nations, their
colonial history, and their relationship to the British Commonwealth, or to the
sometimes sui generis constitutional identity of the United States. Accordingly,
in this Essay I try to identify and discuss both some features that separate Latin
from Anglophone counties en bloc, and also some that separate just a portion
of the English-speaking world from the “Latinate” characteristics of the InterAmerican system as a whole. One of the key arguments I assert here, in general,
is that the Inter-American human rights system, for a variety of historical and institutional reasons, is, in its history, at present, and increasingly a system heavily
influenced by the legal and political culture of the Latin countries of the region.
At times, this leads to a generalized disengagement of English-speaking countries
generally, and at other times to the alienation of a subset of Anglophone nations,
1 For purposes of this Essay, I will treat Canada as an English-speaking country because it is the
country’s dominant language, despite its importantly bilingual character (which in turn is one of the
distinguishing features of Canada from other predominantly English-speaking countries).
2 This remains true even though many countries of the civil law tradition in Latin America,
in contrast to their Continental European counterparts, are widely regarded as having public law
systems deeply influenced by the United States. See John Henry Merryman, David Scott Clark
& John Owen Haley, The Civil Law Tradition: Europe, Latin America, and East Asia 463
(1994); John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An
Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America 3–4 (3d ed. 2007).
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but the end result is the same: The progressive entrenchment of a “two-speed”
Inter-American system, in which the authority and success of the norms and institutions are much greater in some countries (Spanish-speaking, especially) and
weaker in others.
It is essential that we confront those questions clearly and directly, because
both practical experience and scholarly study support a conclusion that such a
divide is not compatible with the long-term effectiveness of the regional human
rights regime. Successful international regimes invariably must come to terms
with the important differences among their members, mediating and harmonizing in order to construct a strong common whole. Whether we look at the European Union, the International Criminal Court, or the World Trade Organization,
we find an ongoing need to address and respect national divergences while still
maintaining the coherence and effectiveness of the complex supranational entities. In some ways, this is especially true of human rights regimes, given the
extent to which they invariably reach more deeply into domestic law and politics. Finally, regional human rights systems in some ways represent the most
acute examples of the necessity of maintaining balance and harmony among the
national differences of their constituent states. One of the basic purposes of regional human rights systems, after all, is to leverage the political, economic, and
historical commonalities and convergences among certain groups of countries in
order to construct human rights institutions and processes that are more capable
of achieving legitimacy and effectiveness than their global, United Nations-based
counterparts.
Thus, the longer that this Anglo-Latin Divide remains operative in the hemispheric human rights system, and the longer the system continues to develop
principally according to the parameters of only one side of that divide, the more
likely it is that the disengagement of the English-speaking world will become
entrenched and permanent. It is like two trains on not-quite parallel tracks that
appear quite close early on, but the further they travel, the more the distance
between them becomes difficult, and eventually impossible, to bridge.
What follows, therefore, is merely a first attempt (to my knowledge no published work has ever tried to catalogue and analyze the Anglo-Latin Divide comprehensively) to identify some of the key sources of that division, and to consider
what its implications are for the future health and strength of the protection and
promotion of human rights in the Western Hemisphere. In the spirit of the seminar for which the paper is being produced, I will not hesitate sometimes to be
more speculative on these points in the interest of provoking debate and deeper
reflection in the group. I also will not rely on prior published work of a scholarly
nature. Direct practical experience brings out many relevant examples that will
not always have been recognized in the publicly available debates and literature.
II

Systemic and Structural Questions

The most obvious difference between the Anglo and Latin worlds has to do with
the ratification of the American Convention and the acceptance of the jurisdic-
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tion of the Inter-American Court. The Inter-American Commission has perennially and rightly identified the lack of universalization of the basic treaty among
the Organization of American States (OAS) Member States as one of the most
important problems affecting the long-term strength and health of the system.3
The split between the ACHR-party and ACHR-non-party states is, of course,
structurally facilitated by the unique, complicated, and suboptimal dualism in
the Inter-American system generally. We are all very familiar with the weaknesses
and incoherence of a system in which the American Declaration and American
Convention apply asymmetrically to different countries, and in which the InterAmerican Commission has different jurisdictional mandates and authority with
respect to different states in the same system. Yet, in the annual ritual of pleading for ratification and acceptance, the Commission has never (as far as I have
been able to tell) explicitly recognized the extremely strong correlation between
non-ratification and the English-speaking OAS member states, one that becomes
even stronger when focusing more narrowly on acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Inter-American Court. That correlation begs the question: Why? It seems improbable that the answer lies only in the absence of political will, as the implicit
default assumption of the Commission’s annual pleas for ratification would have
it. Nor can the explanation lie only in the peculiarly idiosyncratic dynamics of
U.S. exceptionalism and isolationism, given the similarity in position of the other
English-speaking countries on this score.4 There are several factors that could
play a role in helping to account for this convergence among Anglo countries
and their collective divergence from the Latin ones.
One part of the explanation might lie in the strong common law tradition
of dualism with respect to international law generally, a feature that the constitutional systems of all of the former British colonies of North America have in
some degree inherited from England.5 The Inter-American Court, in particular,
has over the years consistently pressed toward a strongly monist understanding
of the treaty, of international law and international human rights law generally,
and of the applicability of its own jurisprudence. This was especially evident
in the years in which Judge Cançado Trindade was a member of (and undeniably one of the dominant intellectual influences on) the Court, but, even if in
somewhat less extreme form, it is still true today, for instance in the developing
doctrine of conventionality control. Conventionality control is an idea still in
the process of being defined in the Court’s jurisprudence, and in its softer forms
it is not incompatible with a wide variety of different constitutional traditions.
In some of the Court’s case law, however, conventionality control has been asserted in ways that are very aggressively monist and hierarchical. These latter
3 See, e.g., Annual Rep. of the Inter-Am. Comm’n of Human Rights, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 50, corr. 1, ch. 4, at 359, 379–85 (2013), http://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/docs/annual/2013/docs-en/AnnualReport-Chap4-Intro-A.pdf.
4 It is worth highlighting that even in Europe it is self-evident that the United Kingdom has
always had a somewhat more fraught relationship with the regional human rights system than many
of its Continental counterparts.
5 Fiona de Londras, Dualism, Domestic Courts, and the Rule of International Law, in The Rule
of Law in Comparative Perspective 217, 220 (Mortimer Sellers & Tadeusz Tomaszewski eds.,
Springer, Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law & Justice Ser. No. 3, 2010).
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interpretations of the doctrine would, I believe, deeply exacerbate and entrench
the Anglophone countries’ reluctance to ratify the American Convention or to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court.
A second possible reason for the Anglo-Latin divide has to do with the particular institutional relationships between the judiciary and the legislative power
that most common law systems loosely share. Without being able to develop the
idea at length in this short space, we could express this point in a compressed
manner by saying that—at least in the United States—one can find throughout
the history of the Republic a sort of Madisonian view of judges as being politically accountable and integrated into the political community.6 To not have a
professional class of judges (cum civil servants), as is typical of civil law systems,
but rather judges who come from the practicing bar and are understood to be
reflective of and responsive to their political community, is a hallmark of U.S.
constitutional structure and tradition, in particular, but I believe there are at
least echoes of this understanding in the English tradition of common law adjudication more generally, and thus in much of the English-speaking world today
as well.
The connection with ratification of treaties, especially human rights treaties,
is this: They almost inevitably strengthen judicial power in ways that remove
judges further from the vicissitudes of ordinary domestic politics, from democratic responsiveness and accountability. Indeed, this is in part exactly why, under some circumstances, we like and need international human rights mechanisms: in order to help guarantee fundamental rights, and the institutional integrity of the judges called to protect those rights, even against the potential
abuses of democratic majorities. I am not therefore suggesting that this is necessarily a bad thing, but rather pointing out that it is a potential source of tension
with a more typically U.S. (and possibly more broadly common law) view of
the proper relationship between the judiciary and democracy, and helps explain
some of the greater background resistance to ratification and acceptance of international jurisdiction. A somewhat different way of putting this point, captured
nicely by Larry Helfer, is that international human rights mechanisms can sometimes tend to “overlegalize” human rights.7 According to Helfer, that dynamic
has contributed significantly to the English-speaking Caribbean’s resistance to
the Inter-American system. It is a little more speculative, but not unreasonable,
to see it also as one element in the U.S. and Canadian skepticism toward international control of domestic human rights norms.
In much of the Latin world, as in much of Continental Europe, any possible reluctance to allow international human rights law to enhance the roles
of judges and insulate them more from democratic politics and legislation was
largely swept aside by the experience of dictatorship. As various studies have
6 Lisa Hilbink, Law and Politics in a Madisonian Republic: Opportunities and Challenges for
Judges and Citizens in the New Europe, in After National Democracy: Rights, Law and Power
in America and the New Europe 121, 125 (Lars Trägårdh ed., 2004).
7 Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, in International Law and
Society 125 (Laura Dickinson ed., 2007).
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shown in recent decades, a country’s direct history of the collapse of democracy
and of the rise of criminal, abusive, and authoritarian regimes has a direct and
empirically verifiable relationship to its later willingness to accept international
authority and to cede some of its traditionally sovereign independence to supervisory human rights mechanisms.8 Not having had that experience (with the
very small exception of Grenada), the English-speaking countries of the Americas are less likely to accept unproblematically the idea that international norms,
processes, and institutions are necessary safeguards of constitutional democracy
and freedom.
One final structural issue that works against the full acceptance of the InterAmerican system, in the United States at least, is the strength and centrality of
federalism in that country. Although this is less of an “English-speaking” phenomenon (and in fact unites countries as otherwise distinct as Brazil, Argentina,
Mexico, and Canada with the United States), it is fair to say that federalism has
a different and stronger valence in the constitutional identity of the United States
than anywhere else in the hemisphere. Because international treaties generally,
and international human rights treaties even more so, have a very high potential to alter what is otherwise the always-contentious balance of power between
the central government and the several states. We have seen federalism concerns
surface strongly in every single treaty ratification debate in the United States,
and the few human rights treaties that have been ratified by that country have
all contained strongly-worded reservations seeking to minimize their impact on
the federal-state political settlement.9
Before going on, I would like to emphasize that this descriptive identification of various possible structural and systemic barriers to fuller integration of
the English-speaking nations of the hemisphere into the Inter-American system
is not in any way intended to be a defense of or apology for one or another of
the points. Rather, the aim is political realism and cultural accuracy. To the extent that these are, in fact, contributing elements in maintaining the Anglo-Latin
Divide, no amount of exhortations to universalization of the system will be sufficient unless either the system adapts to them or the English-speaking countries
experience a historic evolution in their constitutional systems and identities (ei8

See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 Int’l Org. 217 (2000).
9 E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the
extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end
that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate
measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.
138 Cong. Rec. 8068 (1992) (Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent); see also Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987); 136 Cong. Rec. 36,192 (1990) (Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent).
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ther incrementally over time as has, to a degree, been true of the United Kingdom
and the European system, or as would presumably be more immediately the case
if, for instance, any of them underwent a period of the collapse of democracy
and the rise of dictatorial rule and systematic, gross violations of human rights).
III

Differences Stemming from Divergent Legal Traditions

A second important dimension of the Anglo-Latin Divide is more strictly related
to the gaps between the common law and civil law traditions. Even though in
the twenty-first century, so many aspects of the legal system of any country have
been shaped by globalization and by the dominance of modern bureaucraticadministrative states, still it is widely recognized that legal traditions are in a
way “sticky”—that is, they continue to exert lasting influences on the way that
law is conceived and practiced even long after the origins of their particularities have become historical artifacts.10 In a variety of ways, the Inter-American
human rights system incorporates details of the civil law tradition more than it
reflects any heritage of the common law tradition. That alone is unremarkable,
for international law in general is more strongly influenced by the civil law tradition. In some specific ways, however, this link to the civil law tradition within the
Inter-American human rights system leads to a number of practices that make
it somewhat more difficult for common law systems and the lawyers formed
within them to find a comfortable home. These characteristics can be further divided loosely into those of a more procedural nature and those relating to more
substantive questions, in particular regarding sources of law.
In the procedural area, the civil law tradition’s emphasis on written procedures and the relative unimportance of orality in legal process is one such detail.
More often than not, the Inter-American Commission does not have any hearing at all associated with a contentious case. More significantly, even when it
does have a hearing, the process tends to be quite pro forma and not substantive. Rarely are substantial arguments of law made; never are those argument
tested and probed. If the hearing involves witness testimony, there is no practice
of serious witness examination, either directly by the Commission or by the adverse party. In short, the oral hearings are almost always singularly unhelpful.
Instead, nearly everything is done in writing.11 Although these differences are
also to some degree evident in the procedure and practice of the Inter-American
Court as well, it is before the Commission that they are consistent and consistently problematic.
To the extent that the difference in the importance of orality affects the taking
of witness testimony, it also connects to broader differences regarding the taking
and evaluation of evidence more generally. As Alvaro Paúl-Díaz has convinc10 See generally Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 Int’l & Comp.
L.Q. 52 (1996).
11 The additional difficulty at that point is that the Commissioners almost never actually read the
documents in the case files. See Dinah Shelton, The Rules and the Reality of Petition Procedures the
Inter-American Human Rights System, 5 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1 (2015). This, however,
is not a problem of the Anglo-Latin divide. It is, distressingly, universal.
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ingly shown in his recent and extremely comprehensive doctoral dissertation on
the topic,12 the Inter-American Court (and—although it is not within the scope
of his study—the same is even more true of the Commission) employs a very
limited set of rules and standards of evidence that are highly autonomous (from
domestic tribunals, for instance), highly informal, and highly flexible in their application. In this respect, it somewhat resembles a typical civil law tribunal, but
in an extreme form. It inevitably, in the same measure, diverges from the much
more circumscribed and well-defined rules of evidence typical of common law
procedures. At times, this comparative absence of evidentiary rules and standards results in practices that would be considered quite improper in a system
that more tightly controls rules of evidence.13 As Paúl-Díaz put it:
The Court defines a limited number of rules governing its evidentiary
proceedings and applies them in a flexible way. The reality resembles strongly the procedural custom of civil law countries. Considering the high proportion of common law OAS members that still
reject the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court should ponder whether it
should encourage these States to accept its jurisdiction by establishing rules of procedure more akin to their legal tradition. Of course,
there are other complex reasons why these countries have distanced
themselves from the Court’s system, but their lack of acceptance of
the Court’s jurisdiction cannot be attributed only to a desire to be
free from the application of the ACHR. They are also perceived to
be aliens to the Inter-American system, which seems more focused
towards Latin countries. This sentiment is probably increased by the
Inter-American Court’s procedural rules.14
Sometimes, the procedural differences between civil law and common law
systems, and the Commission and Court’s persistent orientation toward the former, are reflected less in the internal procedures of the Inter-American institutions themselves, and more in their difficulty in appreciating the significance of
procedural differences among the member states. In the interest of space here,
just one example will have to suffice. In common law systems, investigating police and prosecutors who direct the investigation of a crime are not part of the
judiciary but instead part of the executive branch. This is unlike typical civil
law systems in the Americas and elsewhere, where the investigation of a crime is
conducted by a judicial officer and the judicial police. In that context, the Commission has had persistent problems exercising appropriate supervisory control
12 Álvaro I. Paúl-Díaz, In Search of the Principles and Rules of Evidence Applied by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Dublin
Trinity College School of Law) (on file with author).
13 Take, for instance, the fact that the principal expert witness in one of the most controversial
and widely-criticized cases the Court has ever decided, Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, on whose testimony the main and most questionable finding of the Court was made, had a significant financial
stake in the outcome of the Court’s case—a clear conflict of interest that was allowed to pass without comment. See Artavia Murillo (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Nov. 28, 2012).
14 Paúl-Díaz, supra note 12, at 137.

2015]

Carozza: The Future of the Inter-Am. System

over prosecutorial conduct in common law systems, frequently assimilating it to
the civil law model by seeking to require, for instance, that any confession must
be made before a “judicial officer”—a requirement that would seem curiously
inappropriate to lawyers in most common law systems. In other words, the procedural model of the civil law is, by default, allowed to shape the substantive
standard adopted.
A problem that similarly lies at the intersection of procedure and substance
arises in the application of the principle of iura novit curia. This principle, that
“the court knows the law,” allows the tribunal in question to adopt legal arguments and use norms that the parties did not raise in the proceedings. Although
not completely unknown in common law countries—even if the Latin term is
not generally used to identify the practice—it is a practice that is used sparingly, if at all, because the adverse parties are generally considered responsible
for identifying the appropriate cause of action and marshaling the law and arguments in its favor. A common law court would not normally insert a new
claim or cause of action based on the alleged facts in the event that the plaintiff
fails to do so. Yet, this is exactly what happens in the Inter-American system,
with great frequency and to extreme levels. Under the banner of iura novit curia, the Commission routinely inserts new claims into cases, finding violations
never asserted by the petitioners. In my time at the Commission, it was one of
the most consistent causes of internal disagreement among the members, with
the two Commissioners from the English-speaking common law countries consistently in disagreement with our five Latin colleagues on the frequency and
extent to which the doctrine was employed. It is a practice, especially in the extremely liberal form it is used in the Inter-American system, that is very difficult
for common law lawyers to accept, both because a procedural rule can result
in a hugely different substantive case, and also because it implicitly represents
a judicial role that is deeply at odds with the traditionally common law vision
of a judge as an impartial arbiter of an adversarial dispute between two other
parties.
Moving more firmly toward substantive differences from procedural ones,
some of the key difficulties for common law jurists in the Inter-American system
have to do with the sources of law. Comparative law scholars will often identify
the sources of law that are recognized, and the manner in which they are employed, as constituting the most fundamental and persistent differences between
two different legal traditions, including between common law and civil law. It is
perhaps not surprising, then, that some of the sources of law and the ways they
are handled in the Inter-American Court and Commission can be difficult for
common law jurists to understand and accept. The uses of prior case law and
precedent, from a common law point of view, is extremely weak and inconsistent in the Inter-American institutions. That is, prior cases are frequently cited
without any serious analysis of how they are the same or different or what the
relevant prior case actually holds and whether it is applicable in the same way.
The end result is that a line of cases on a particular question can be substantially inconsistent and lacking in coherence. Again, to cite only one prominent
example, the operative standards, language, and criteria that the Court has used
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in a long line of cases assessing the validity of amnesty laws is so inconsistent
that it is almost impossible to state with any confidence exactly why they are
incompatible under the Convention and what the criteria of judgment are.15
Another divergence in sources of law has to do with the Court’s very aggressive use, especially in the particular historical period that coincided with Judge
Cançado Trindade’s tenure on the Court, of jus cogens as a source of applicable norms. To some extent, this can be seen as a symptom of the Commission
and Court’s extremely broad use of a wide range of norms that would be unrecognized as formal sources of international law in general—soft law, unratified
treaties, expansive assertions of custom, and a putatively normative “corpus juris” in one area or another. This is probably less a reflection of any Anglo-Latin
divide than it is a divide between the Inter-American practice and the classically accepted standards of public international law more generally. Nevertheless, there is something in the Inter-American liberality of the use of sources, and
especially the institutions’ appeal to a variety of non-consensual sources of law,
that appears to overlap with the observations made earlier in this essay regarding
the different conceptions regarding the roles of judges, their political accountability, and their relative disregard for what would be accepted practice internal
to any domestic jurisdiction of any legal tradition of the region. It is hard, for
example, to imagine a common law court asserting that a particular legislative
statute was not only contrary to the Convention but actually void ab initio—that
is, it was never a “law” at all—the way that the Inter-American Court did in La
Cantuta and similar cases.16
Finally, and perhaps speculatively, it is worth asking whether, on some important occasions, the very conceptual language that the Court and Commission employ (especially the Court) has a tone and valence that makes it less
easily accessible for common law jurists. One of the recognized paradigmatic
differences between the civil law and common law traditions—rooted in very
clearly-identifiable historic and structural origins—is their relative penchant for
(in the case of civil law adjudication) and aversion to (in the case of common
law adjudication) high degrees of abstraction and generality. Where common
law adjudication begins with cases and controversies and facts, and tends to
reason by analogy and induction to a rule of law, the civil law is said to begin
from systematic principles and deduce its way to their specific application. One
of the consequences in the Inter-American system, I suspect, is the frequency
with which the Court and Commission propose broad and abstract principles
that sometimes seem impossibly vague and unhelpful to someone with a more
typical common law mentalité.17 Concepts like vida digna, plan de vida, cosmovisión,18 and others come to mind. It is not that any of these, and concepts like
15 See Luigi Crema, Are Amnesties still An Option? A Non-Policy Based Critique of the InterAmerican Approach (Notre Dame Ctr. for Civil & Human Rights, Working Paper Ser. No. 6, 2013),
http://law.nd.edu/assets/99931/cremaamnesties.pdf.
16 See, e.g., La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006).
17 Legrand, supra note 10, at 52.
18 That is, a comprehensive view of all reality.
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them, do not make sense or are improper or illegitimate. What I am trying to
put my finger on is more a reflection of judicial style and language. As even my
students often point out, one senses very clearly, reading decisions like these,
that it is not an English-speaking court, but a foreign court whose judgments
require translation, not just linguistically but conceptually and culturally.
IV Substantive Differences in Applicable Human Rights Norms
A vast literature of comparative constitutional law, and to a lesser extent comparative approaches to international human rights law, confirms the relevance
of important differences in approaches to rights across cultures and societies
and constitutional systems. We can expect no less within the Inter-American
system, with its thirty-five different nations extending nearly pole to pole. Some
of the Anglo-Latin divide can be traced to these divergences in the substantive
interpretation and application of the applicable human rights instruments of the
Inter-American system. These differences can be more superficial or more profound, linked to legal culture or to political history, and more ephemeral or
more persistent. More often than not, they only affect one or a small group of
the English-speaking countries, rather than the Anglophone world as a whole.
But they do exist, and in aggregate may help to perpetuate the gap between the
two cultural spheres of the Americas. For purposes of this Essay, I will mention
four selected areas where there are discernable divides between at least some part
of the English-speaking world and the Latin countries of the region: the right to
life, constitutional structures and political participation, the rights of indigenous
people, and issues of criminal prosecution and punishment.
A The Right to Life
It is no secret or surprise to any observer that the Commonwealth Caribbean’s
difficult relationship to the Inter-American system stems, in important part, from
the Court and Commission seeking consistently to interpret and apply the American Declaration and the American Convention in ways tending toward abolition
of the death penalty. The denunciation of Trinidad and Tobago centered on this
issue, and the Caribbean resistance has continued to be consistent in this area
of law.19 It is, of course, an acute issue for the United States as well. The normative instruments do not prohibit capital punishment as such, but it is clear
that, by giving an assertively purposive reading to them, the Commission and
Court have taken a position hostile to the practice,20 and thus opposed generally to the English-speaking parts of the hemisphere (even if the death penalty is
neither exclusive to nor universal to English-speaking countries).
Somewhat paradoxically, the assertion or absence of a Conventional right
to life of human beings prior to birth has been a very different kind of obsta19

See Helfer, supra note 7.
Press Release, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, IACHR Urges OAS Member
States to Abolish the Death Penalty (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_
center/PReleases/2014/115.asp.
20
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cle to the integration of English-speaking countries. For many years, it was said
that the presence of strong language requiring the states party to the American
Convention to protect the right to life, in law, “generally, from the moment
of conception” (Art. 4) was one of the obstacles to Canada’s ratification of the
treaty.21 The American Convention is, on its face, the international human rights
treaty that is most clearly protective of the right to life of the unborn—much
more protective than the domestic law of Canada would allow given its very
broad constitutional protection of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.
With its recent decision in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, however, the InterAmerican Court has given a strikingly narrow reading of the relevant language
of Article 4 of the Convention—a reading not only quite contrary to the treaty’s
intent and its manifest recognition of the right to life from conception, but also
one which in fact impedes states from according legal protection to human embryos, and which signals that the legal protection of unborn human life in later
stages will also have to give way always to the protection of other interests.22
In short, where the treaty’s expansive right to life was previously seen as an
obstacle to ratification by Canada, the Court’s opposite interpretation of that
language will almost certainly provoke a strong backlash against ratification in
the United States where for some time the clear trend in both popular opinion
and in law has been to back away from the earlier and more extreme versions
of the constitutional right to an abortion.
B

Constitutional Structures and Political Participation

On a few occasions, the Inter-American Commission (more so than the Court,
but perhaps because the latter has not yet been given a clear opportunity) has
issued merits reports showing a willingness to question and condemn constitutional arrangements having deep roots in a nation’s history and in its complex
political compromises. The paradigmatic example is the case involving the statehood of Washington, D.C., where the Commission essentially ignored the distinctive historical place of the District of Columbia in the constitutional framework and concerns of the United States, and instead applied the American Declaration in a very abstract, acontextual, and formalistic way to find the United
States in violation of its international obligations.23 While this decision does not,
by itself, have significant implications for other English-speaking countries, it is
hard to overstate how much decisions like this serve to diffuse a concern that
the Inter-American institutions have no regard for the historical and political distinctiveness of any of the member states. Although the attitude is not confined
to the constitutional systems of English-language nations, in a system otherwise
21 William A. Schabas, Canadian Ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights,
16 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 315, 322–23 (1998).
22 Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Nov. 28, 2012). For a comprehensive critique of the
many problematic aspects of this decision, see the Ligia De Jesus trilogy of articles.
23 See Statehood Solidarity Comm’n v. United States, Case 11.204, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 98/03, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003), http://cidh.org/annualrep/
2003eng/USA.11204.htm.
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structurally oriented toward the Latin world it may be more worrisome to the
Anglophone half of the divide.
C Indigenous Peoples and Land Rights
Although in many ways the case law on the rights of indigenous people is among
the most important and significant parts of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system as a whole, it is well-known that the United States and Canada find
the Inter-American decisions in this area to go far beyond the treaty provisions,
to be inapplicable to their circumstances, and to reflect a model of relationships
between indigenous populations and the state based on a variety of Latin realities that are radically different from those in English-speaking North America.
As illustrated by the United States’ response to the Commission’s merits report
and follow-up hearings in the Dann case, for example, the typical Inter-American
remedy asking that vast portions of both private and public lands be returned
to indigenous peoples is not a position that will be accepted any time in the
foreseeable future.24
D Criminal Prosecutions and Punishment
Throughout the hemisphere, and not merely in the English-speaking parts of the
region, the Inter-American jurisprudence has sometimes been criticized for being too oriented toward using criminal punishment as a tool of redress. Across
a wide range of different human rights violations, the remedies prescribed by
the Inter-American court include investigation and punishment of the perpetrators. In many cases this is certainly appropriate and necessary, and in general
while there is some doubt or reasonable criticism about possible excesses in the
mandate to investigate and punish, it is not a criticism that seems connected to
the Anglo-Latin Divide. However, there are two circumstances in which Anglophone countries may have heightened concerns about the tendency toward punitivism of the Commission and Court. First, the Court has endorsed the need for
criminal punishment even for violations arising out of relations between private
parties that would not, in ordinary common law systems, fall within the boundaries of criminal law. For instance, in Albán-Cornejo v. Ecuador, the Court required criminal investigation, prosecution, and punishment of a medical doctor
accused of negligent malpractice in a state hospital;25 this is a circumstance in
which the use of criminal sanctions would be unusual in common law systems (at
least, those similar to that of the United States), and where civil remedies would
be considered more appropriate. In Ecuador, as is the case in a number of more
traditional civil law countries, criminal conviction is a necessary prerequisite for
seeking civil damages, so the requirement makes some sense in context. In a
24 See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002), http://cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.
htm.
25 Albán-Cornejo v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 171 (Nov. 22, 2007).
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common law system, however, a blanket rule that such circumstances warrant
the deployment of the criminal sanction power of the state is excessive.
Second, the Inter-American faith in the importance of criminal punishment
is sometimes pursued even at the expense of due process rights of the accused.
The Court has suggested that many protections against the potential abuse of
prosecutorial power of the state ought to be set aside any time there is a serious
violation of human rights at stake—for instance, statutes of limitation may not
be applied to bar the action. I do not believe that most common law jurisdictions
would be comfortable so easily setting aside rules that are regarded as essential
due process protections of the rights of the accused, even in cases where the
crime alleged to have been committed is quite grave.
V Administrative and Practical Issues
The final set of problems in the Inter-American human rights system that reinforce the Anglo-Latin Divide are of a more narrow administrative and practical
character. In some ways these are the most straightforward and least complex,
and yet at the same time on a day-to-day basis they are among the most significant contributors to the gap between the Anglophone and Latin countries in the
system.
The first problem is the difference of language in a very direct sense, not
merely as a proxy for other and deeper divergences of legal and political culture. Spanish is unquestionably the dominant working language throughout the
system. In some periods of the history of the system, the Court never even bothered to have its judgments and public documents translated into English. Today,
fortunately, written translation and oral interpretation are the norm. However,
translations are often done poorly, including in ways that affirmatively affect the
substantive understanding of documents across languages. Various problems in
the internal administration of the Secretariat of the Commission (I cannot speak
from experience of the Court in this regard) ensure that translations are routinely
done at the very last minute, often making it very difficult for English-speaking
Commissioners to prepare for sessions and to contribute effectively to the evaluation of a draft report.
The second practical reality that has the effect of entrenching the Anglo-Latin
Divide is the comparatively small number of English-speaking Commissioners
and Judges. In the Court this is inevitable given the absence of state parties from
the Anglophone countries. It is a circular problem, however, insofar as the absence of judges from the English-speaking countries reinforces the difficulty of
getting English-speaking countries to accede to the jurisdiction. The presence
of an Anglophone Caribbean judge on the Court has, in certain periods, been
greatly beneficial in this regard, but still insufficient. In the Commission, Anglophone members are always present, but rarely in numbers that are close to
being proportionate to the number of states or the total population of the hemisphere who are English-speaking. Within the Secretariat of the Commission, the
number of U.S. lawyers is significant, but the perennial, near-total absence of

2015]

Carozza: The Future of the Inter-Am. System

professionals from the Commonwealth Caribbean is striking.
Finally, it is a basic but persistent fact that the Caribbean nations are generally
and consistently underrepresented in the working agenda of the Commission.
The Commission’s 2008 visit to Jamaica, for instance, was the first in loco visit
to an English-speaking Caribbean nation in over a dozen years. The report of the
visit took three years to draft, and today it constitutes the only country report
on any Anglophone Caribbean nation available on the Commission’s website,
which otherwise includes ninety-three country reports on Latin-region countries
dating back to the very first report of all, on Cuba in 1962. It is, of course, a historical reality that the Caribbean nations came late to the Inter-American human
rights system, and that the Commission came of age and built its reputation and
influence in the dark period of brutal Latin American dictatorships. Therefore, it
would be unrealistic to expect the record to reflect equal attention to these two
subregions. The continued neglect of the Caribbean today, however, is harder
to justify and appears to reflect little more than an entrenched pattern inherited
from another era.
VI Possible Steps Forward
Some of the steps that can be taken to try to bridge the Anglo-Latin Divide,
or at least to mitigate its negative implications for the system, are relatively
straightforward. For example, a deliberate policy of devoting more attention
to the Caribbean in the Commission’s work could be immediate and unproblematic. Hiring more professional staff from the region is more difficult but still
does not require any significant structural changes. The problems of translation
may require some additional resources, but a great deal of the problem can be
addressed by altering the working methods and schedules of the Secretariat to
permit sufficient time.
Changing the composition of the Commission or Court to have a broader
representation of English-speaking countries would be a much greater challenge.
In the case of the Court, it requires careful thought about whether the composition should bet on a hoped-for future in which the Anglophone countries are
active participants, or remain merely reflective of a current reality. More general
considerations regarding the reform of the composition of the Court and Commission are subjects to which Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has devoted in‐depth
consideration.26
With respect to the collection of problems relative to procedure, evidence,
and sources of law, at least part of the problem, in my experience, arises from
the basic and historically conditioned orientation of the system (and of the Commission in particular) toward victims. To be sure, in many ways this is a laudable
and necessary bias, especially in the historical context of the hemisphere’s struggle with gross and systematic violations. However, it runs up against a counter26 See Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Between Idealism and Realism: A Few Comparative Reflections and Proposals on the Appointment Process of the Inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights Members, 5 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. 29 (2015).
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vailing concern as well: To the extent that the Commission remains a consistent
advocate against states in its approach to its work, it will always struggle to
some degree to gain full credibility as an institution of the impartial rule of law.
To put it another way, for the Commission to build up the institutional legitimacy necessary to really universalize the system as a whole, it must, in the long
run, come to terms with its schizophrenic nature as both advocate and adjudicator, both prosecutor and judge, promoter-educator and litigator. Functional
differentiation and coherence of mandate is a key to the long-term sustainability
of the Commission’s relationship with all of the countries of the region, but in
particular with those whose history and tradition of democratic rule has not put
them in a position of indebtedness to the Commission for intervening against
dictatorship and systematic abuses. A consistently and institutionally pro-victim
and anti-state orientation is a hard sell where democracy and the rule of law
have been the norm (even after acknowledging that no system is without need
for external checks and controls).
A different but closely-related and necessary shift in the basic orientation of
the Inter-American human rights system is toward one that takes much more
seriously the diversity of constitutional, political, cultural, and legal cultures in
the hemisphere. The practice and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights system—especially when seen in contrast to its European regional
counterpart—is almost completely lacking in doctrines and sensibilities that allow a pluralism of approaches to the protection of human rights to flourish
within it. There is no explicit functional equivalent to a margin of appreciation
doctrine, for instance. This fact is related to the immediately prior point because
the principal historical explanations typically given for the absence of doctrines
of constitutional pluralism are (a) that democracy and the domestic rule of law
in the Americas are too weak to permit the necessary degree of trust in domestic
institutions; and (b) the paradigmatic types of violations that have been at the
core of the Inter-American system—that is, systematic abuses of non-derogable
rights—do not reasonably allow for the tolerance of divergent understandings
and applications. However, much these facts may have reasonably justified a past
position strongly opposed to pluralism in the hemisphere, it is highly doubtful
that they continue to justify the same degree of rigid uniformity today, when
both the types of states and the types of violations that the system engages are
much more complex and ambiguous. More directly to the point of the AngloLatin divide however, is this: Even in the past, the English-speaking portions of
the hemisphere have arguably never fit neatly into a system whose basic operative assumptions are built around the confrontation of criminal regimes. If the
Anglophone world is to be taken more seriously in the Inter-American system, a
greater tolerance of constitutional pluralism akin to the European model needs
to be cultivated in this hemisphere as well. This means, concretely, not only a
much more robust use of comparative law in general, but the development of
some formal doctrines of pluralism that are analogous to the margin of appreciation.
Of course, at the extreme end of reform, there is a different option available
as well, that in a certain respect is more “pure.” One could coherently adopt a
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position that the proper response to the Anglo-Latin divide is to force the issue
by requiring universal ratification of the American Convention and universal acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court in order to participate in the regional
human rights system at all, or even as a condition of membership in the OAS. It
is an approach similar to that which prevails in the European system. As tidy as
that solution may seem, even if politically it were feasible to erect such a framework, it would not be a very satisfactory long-term outcome. The most likely
consequence would be the total withdrawal of the English-speaking world from
the Inter-American human rights system. As a Latin American human rights system, it might very well benefit from a greater degree of coherence and integration
among its members and permit a fuller development of its normative content. Yet
the price would be high—too high in my view: the complete disengagement of all
of the English-speaking nations of the Americas from hemispheric mechanisms
of human rights supervision and protection.
If we sincerely desire the long-term viability and strength of the Inter-American system, there seems to be no way forward that does not make a much more
serious and sustained effort to integrate the English-speaking world into what is,
at present and increasingly, a disproportionately Latin American human rights
system. If it is not addressed, the Anglo-Latin Divide will be the fracture at the
root of human rights protections in the Western Hemisphere that will ensure
that the endemic structural weakness of the whole system lasts indefinitely into
the future.
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